A new investigation reveals that two UK-registered cryptocurrency exchanges quietly moved around $1 billion for Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), raising urgent questions about global crypto oversight.
Key Takeaways
- Iran’s IRGC used two UK-registered exchanges to move about $1 billion in cryptocurrency, largely in USDT on the TRON blockchain.
- TRM Labs linked these exchanges to Babak Morteza Zanjani, a known Iranian financier previously sanctioned for aiding the IRGC.
- The platforms, Zedcex and Zedxion, operated as a single financial entity, routing funds across borders without triggering regulatory red flags.
- Funds reached both terrorist-linked figures and domestic Iranian exchanges, suggesting crypto is now central to Iran’s sanctions evasion toolkit.
What Happened?
Blockchain intelligence firm TRM Labs uncovered a sophisticated financial network where Iran’s IRGC leveraged UK-based crypto platforms to bypass global sanctions. Over two years, nearly $1 billion was moved through these platforms, exposing regulatory blind spots in the crypto sector.
🌍 Bitcoin (CRYPTO: $BTC) may be playing a key role in Iran’s unrest.
— Quant Data (@QuantData) January 9, 2026
The Iranian Revolutionary Guard reportedly moved $1B through crypto exchanges to evade sanctions while the rial crashed to 1.42M per USD, down 40% since June 2025. Ordinary citizens suffer as crypto is used… pic.twitter.com/CzMDav8But
The Crypto Pathway Used by a Sanctioned Military Force
Two cryptocurrency exchanges, Zedcex and Zedxion, were at the heart of the operation. Although registered separately, both shared the same director, address, and operational structure, indicating they were functionally a single entity. These platforms processed more than 56 percent of their total activity for IRGC-linked wallets, with that share peaking at 87 percent in 2024, before dipping to 48 percent in 2025.
This was not incidental usage. The platforms formed part of a deliberate, scalable infrastructure for sanctions evasion. Funds were moved primarily in Tether (USDT) on the TRON blockchain, a choice driven by its low costs and deep liquidity.
The platforms presented themselves publicly as conventional trading venues but functioned as offshore stablecoin clearinghouses, enabling large-scale value transfers without traditional banking involvement.
The Man Behind the Network: Babak Morteza Zanjani
The companies’ links to Babak Morteza Zanjani add a deeper layer of concern. Zanjani was previously sanctioned by the US and EU for laundering billions on behalf of the Iranian regime and IRGC. Although those sanctions were lifted under a past nuclear agreement, Zanjani later served prison time in Iran for embezzlement, only to re-emerge publicly in 2025 as part of the DotOne Holding Group.
His reappearance coincided with the creation of Zedcex, replacing Zedxion shortly after he formally exited its leadership. This corporate maneuver appeared designed to obscure continuity while keeping operations intact.
Zanjani has also publicly promoted blockchain-based financial systems for Iran. In July 2025, he claimed on X that he had advised the Central Bank of Iran to adopt blockchain infrastructure, implemented under approval from Iran’s Supreme National Security Council.
Direct Links to Terror Financing and Iran’s Domestic Crypto Scene
TRM Labs’ analysis revealed direct transfers from IRGC-controlled wallets to Sa’id Ahmad Muhammad al‑Jamal, a figure sanctioned by the US Treasury for funding the Houthis in Yemen. More than $10 million in USDT was sent without intermediary routing, confirming these wallets were not just exchange infrastructure but active financing channels.
Further investigation showed funds routed through Zedcex later reached domestic Iranian exchanges like Nobitex, Wallex, and Aban Tether, embedding sanctioned flows into Iran’s wider crypto economy. These exchanges serve both everyday users and high-risk actors, illustrating the difficulty in separating retail from regime-linked activity.
Fiat Connections Through Turkey
The story doesn’t end with digital assets. Zedcex and Zedxion were linked to Zedpay, a mobile payment processor operating out of Turkey. Zedpay had financial ties to entities like Vepara and Vakif Katilim, both under past scrutiny for Iran-linked transactions. This link allowed digital funds to be converted into fiat, enabling real-world spending and further complicating enforcement.
A Shift in Sanctions Risk
This case signals a critical shift. The risk is no longer just about criminal actors laundering funds. It’s about state-aligned actors building their own financial infrastructure under the guise of legal businesses. The systems are deliberately built to blend into the global crypto market while evading the compliance standards imposed on banks.
Even in a well-regulated jurisdiction like the UK, Zedcex and Zedxion filed dormant corporate reports, used straw directors, and operated out of virtual offices, masking the scale and nature of their operations.
CoinLaw’s Takeaway
I’ve seen a lot of headlines about crypto crimes, but this case is different. It’s not about hacks or scams. This is crypto becoming infrastructure for state-backed sanctions evasion. And what’s most worrying is how easily it all flew under the radar. These platforms operated for years in plain sight under UK registration. That should be a wake-up call. In my experience covering crypto and regulation, the next battlefront isn’t just tracing bad transactions but shutting down entire networks before they become permanent fixtures. This is crypto’s geopolitical reckoning, and the regulators need to catch up fast.
